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INSURANCE: RIGHT OF A DIVORCED WIFE TO RECOVER THE
FACE AMOUNT OF A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY ON HER
HUSBAND'S LIFE-FICKE v. PRUDENTIAL.
The Court of Appeals in the recent case of Ficke v. Prudential
Insurance Company of America' brought the anomalous Kentucky
law governing the right of a divorced wife as beneficiary to recover
on an insurance policy taken out on her husband's life more nearly
in line with the rule set out in the majority of jurisdictions. In this
case suit was filed by a divorcee to recover either the proceeds of.
the policy taken out by her during the marriage, or the amount of
the premiums paid by her with interest. After reviewing past
decisions on the problem, the Court ruled that she was entitled to
recover the face amount of the policy
In strict accordance with settled principles of insurance law the
great majority of courts in other states hold that a life insurance
policy is valid once and for all if an insurable interest existed at the
time the policy was obtained. Because of the socially unproductive
consequences of wagering contracts, and because of a possible induce-
ment on the part of the beneficiary to take the life of the insured,
the requisite of insurable interest must be satisfied. If the party
procuring the policy on another's life can show such an interest m
the life of the insured that great loss will result from his death, and
great benefit will be the result of his continued existence, the
requisite of insurable interest is satisfied. If the insured himself takes
out the policy he may name anyone he desires as beneficiary, since
it is presumed that there will be no danger of a wagering contract
in such a situation.4
Applying these rules to facts involving the divorced wife as
beneficiary, virtually all courts hold that a subsequent divorce will
not prevent the wife from recovering the face amount of the policy
because the insurable interest once acquired cannot later be divested
'305 Ky. 171, 202 S.W 2d 429 (1947)
"Wellhouse v United Paper Co., 29 F 2d 886 (C.C.A. 5th. 1929)
Reilly v Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Phil., 201 Iowa 555, 207 N.W
583 (1926), VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) sec. 53.
3VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 154. That insurable interest
was required early in our law is substantiated by the statute of
14 Geo. III c. 48 (1774) As to the exact nature of a life insurance
contract the authorities are in conflict. An early Kentucky case
referred to the contract as one of indemnity (Adam's Adm'r. v. Reed,
36 S.W 568, decided in 1896) But see: VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed.
1930) page 80, where it is contended that the life insurance contract
is primarily a contract of investment, to pay a certain sum of money
in the event of death.
' Lawrence v. Tray Ins. Co., 6 F Supp. 428 (1934) Nat'l. Life
& Accid. Ins. Co. v Bridgeforth, 220 Ala. 314, 124 So. 886 (1929).
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by the severance of the marriage bonds so far as policies taken out
during the marriage are concerned0 If the husband has taken out
the policy, the right of the wife to recover is dependent on the change
of beneficiary clause; if he has not reserved the right to change the
beneficiaries, the wife has a vested interest which cannot be taken
away by either the divorce or an attempted change by the insured;'
if he has reserved the right to change the beneficiaries, the wife may
still recover on the policy unless he has exercised this right:
Texas alone at the present time holds that divorce ends all
insurable interest so that the wife is unable to collect the proceeds
of the policy in the event of the termination of the marriage, and
that she is limited in her recovery to the premiums which she has
paid from her own pocket.' One court in that state held that divorce
was the "equivalent of civil death, and thereafter her [the wife's]
relations .became that of a stranger and she could take nothing
thereunder."' This rule based on the state's public policy was adopted
by a Federal court in a case presenting a conflict of laws question
when it denied a divorcee the right to recover on a policy issued on
her husband's life, where the marriage occurred m New York, the
contract of insurance was executed in New York, and only the
divorce occurred in Texas' Of course the application of the Texas
rule automatically followed the court's determination to decide the
case according to Texas law
In Kentucky the greatest obstacle to recovery by the divorced
wife has been created by the restoration statute which provides:
"Upon final judgment of divorce from the bonds of
matrimony each party shall be restored all the property
not disposed of at the beginning of the action, that he
or she obtained from or through the other before or
during the marriage and in consideration of the
marriage.""
Prior to the Ficke case, Kentucky decisions consistently held
that divorce would prevent the wife from recovering the face amount
of the policy because the restoration statute was construed to include
insurance as property acquired by reason of marriage, and also
VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 596.
'Filley v Illinois Life Ins. Co., 93 Kan. 193. 144 Pac. 257 (1914).
Jenkins v Jenkins, 112 Calif. App. 402, 297 Pac. 56 (1931)
'Hatch v Hatch. 35 Texas Civ App. 371, 80 S.W 411 (1904)
'Williamson v Modern Woodmen of America, 237 S.W 338, 340
(Tex. 1922).
10 New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v Spence, 104 F 2d 665
(1939) (In this case the court held that under Texas law there was
an involuntary transfer of the wife's vested interest in the policy to
her husband's estate as a result of the divorce.)
" Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 403.060. For a similar provision see:
KY. CIVIL CODE (Carroll, 1938) sec. 425.
STUDENT NOTES AND Co3mmENTS
-because of the alleged cessation of insurable interest.'2 Accordingly,
in the case of Sea v. Conrad the divorced wife was not permitted to
recover on the policy taken out during the marriage." The only
recourse available to the wife was to recover the amount of the
premiums which she had paid; a situation which would arise only
when she had procured the insurance." Bradley v. Bradley's Adm'r"
was prophetical of the position taken in the principal case since dicta
therein pointed to a recovery of the face amount of the policy if the
wife had obtained the policy and had paid the premiums.
Opportunity was afforded in the Ficke case to re-examine prior
-decisions because of two controlling factors: (1) if Mrs. Ficke was
allowed to recover the total amount of premiums paid by her plus
interest, she would recover more than the face amount of the policy-
and (2) in the past no attention had been given to the question of
how much the wife should be charged for the protection she received
from the insurance during the marriage.
In overruling the older cases, the court distinguished policies
procured by the wife on her husband's life and policies taken out
by the insured in which he named his wife as beneficiary. In the
former situation, which was the main problem presented in the
Ficke case, the court held that the wife's insurable interest was not
affected by the divorce and that the policy was not obtained by
reason of the marriage. In the latter, the court intimated that the
policy would be obtained by virtue of the marriage, thus barring
recovery by the wife.
As to the effect of this decision on future cases, the dicta seem
to import no further extension of the court's new position so as to
allow the divorced wife to recover on a policy taken out by her
husband. The court has definitely overruled the theory that insurable
interest will be divested by divorce, but the restoration statute may
still prove a nemesis to recovery where the wife has not paid the
premiums. It is difficult to understand, however, the basis for the
distinction made by the court between policies taken out by the
insured and those taken out by the beneficiary Certainly no insurable
interest would have existed unless there had been a marriage. The
court admits this." If the insurable interest, the stne qua non of the
"Flimin v Flimin's Adm'x., 250 Ky 827, 64 S.W 2d 165 (1933),
Eversole v. Eversole's Adm'x., 169 Ky 234, 183 S.W 494 (1916)
Schauberger v Morel's Adm'r., 168 Ky 368, 182 S.W 198 (1916)
"155 Ky 51, 159 S.W 622 (1913)
"Ibzd.
"178 Ky. 239, 198 S.W 905 (1917).
" 305 Ky 171, 176, 202 S.W 2d 429, 432 (1947).
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insurance contract, were in existence because of the marriage, cer-
tainly the policy itself was also acquired because of the marriage.
Logically a better solution to the problem lies in the legislature
revising the restoration statute so as to expressly exclude insurance
contracts from the scope of the statute.
GILES J. MCCARTHY
